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In a period marked by the development of numerous treaties, conventions,
and statutes designed to regulate international business, the field of international
bankruptcy remains disturbingly resistant to reform. Most of the major initiatives
proposed in past decades have failed completely- others, though adopted, have had
only moderate impact. As a result, the bankruptcy of a multinational enterprise
typically triggers diverse and uncoordinated legal proceedings in various countries
connected to the affairs of that enterprise. For instance, this lack of coordination
imposes substantial costs both on the bankruptcy process itself, by multiplying
administrative expenses, and on international commerce generally, by preventing
lenders from predicting accurately the consequences of debtor insolvency The
need for a method of addressing international insolvencies that is fair, predictable,
and consistent therefore remains pronounced.
The movement to reform international bankruptcy law has been cast largely
as a struggle between two opposing camps: universality and territoriality For the
past few decades, universalists who argue that international bankruptcies should be
administered by a single forum, have been winning the battle. Universalists argue
that the centralized administration of cross-border bankruptcies will provide: (1)
equality of treatment for all creditors; (2) maximization of the value of the
bankruptcy estate; (3) expeditious and efficient administration of the estate; and (4)
predictability of outcome. Universalist principles have shaped the discourse as well
as the goals of the bankruptcy reform movement.
In the year 2000, however, the consensus that had long favored universality
seemed to be weakening. Territoriality, which favors the simultaneous
administration of multiple local bankruptcies, is gaining currency among
commentators. On the legislative front, the international bankruptcy provisions of
the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19991 while purporting to foster
universality, instead reveals only a partial commitment to the universality
approach. Finally, recent cases evidence the increasing tendency of courts to
abandon the battlefield altogether by handling cross-border bankruptcies in an
Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law, © 2003.
1. For current version, see Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975,
108th Cong. (2003).
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extra-regulatory fashion.2
Many recent large bankruptcies, including Swissair, WorldCom, Enron, and
United Airlines, necessarily have multi-junsdictional problems. But smaller
enterprises also operate across international borders. What law to apply is
traditionally a conflict of laws problem. Nevertheless, as Professor Buxbaum and
others point out,3 cross-border insolvencies have not generally been analyzed in
terms of choice of law methodology
First, we need to identify the terminology used in this area of law Professor
Buxbaum mentioned "Universality" and "Territoriality A Although neither
describes the exact situation in the United States today, both are active elements in
efforts to describe courts' efforts to apply the limited legislative guidance.
"Universality maintains that a single forum should administer the bankruptcy of an
insolvent corporation. The bankruptcy proceeding would reach all assets of the
debtor, wherever located, and would distribute those assets to all creditors,
wherever located." 5 Generally, it is assumed that this distribution of assets and
determination of claims would be done according to the forum's own laws.
Territoriality, in contrast, is the familiar state law collection technique of
grabbing the local assets and distributing them to the local creditors according to
its own laws.6 The United States has a long history of trying to reconcile the needs
and interests of local creditors in and to local assets (the race to the court house)
and the desire for equitable distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets.7 Naturally,
if the debtor is not insolvent, a local creditor may be inconvenienced and taxed
with added costs by participating in a foreign proceeding, in theory, however, that
creditor will eventually be paid. It is where the assets are insufficient that equality
of distribution and other bankruptcy protective tools are needed-such is the
international conflict.
As noted, the United States has seldom been purely one or the other. Indeed,
the current regime under Bankruptcy Code section 304 has been characterized as
"modified universality ,,8 This characterization is accurate but a little odd. It would
appear that the United States is truer to Universality than any other nation.
In this piece I do not attempt to set out what choice of law principles should
govern cross-border insolvencies in the United States. Rather I attempt to trace
federal choice of law rules and show how those rules, such as they are, have had
limited use thus far in bankruptcy cases. In Part II I discuss choice of law rules
and identify what federal choice of law rules are in various contexts. In Part Il1 
2. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-
Law Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 23, 23-24 (2000) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter
Buxbaum).
3. Id. at 25; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies:
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AMER. BANKR. L. J. 457, 462 (1991).
4. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 24-27.
5. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 26.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 27.
8. See I I U.S.C. § 304. See also Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 27
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discuss the trend, if it can be called a trend, in cases decided prior to the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1979 ("BRA herein). Part IV examines the structure
of the BRA dealing with cross-border issues and discusses selected cross-border
cases decided under the BRA showing the limited application of federal choice of
law analysis. In Part V I leave with a brief restatement of the problem facing
courts in cross-border insolvency cases rather than a solution, other than to suggest
that developed choice of law principles are designed to inform the choice and
should not be overlooked in deciding whether to apply United States bankruptcy
law.
II. WHOSE CHOICE OF LAW RULES?
A. Choice of Choice of Law Rules
For some time it has been settled that a federal court sitting in diversity
jurisdiction shall apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.9 Klaxon
was based on Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompknso which relied in part on the Rules of
Decision Act." This Act provides that "[tihe laws of the several states shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply ,,12 Thus the "laws of the several states" includes the forum
state's choice of law rules. i3 Does this apply in Bankruptcy9
The answer is curiously clouded. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee
v. Green 4 is a starting point. In Vanston, the issue was whether interest on interest
should be paid in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. '5 If it was payable, the first
mortgage bondholders would be paid in full, but subordinate creditors would have
a reduced share. 16 The Court said:
What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt
at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed, is a question which, in the absence of
overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law.
Determination [of which state's law applies where, as here, other states have
significant contacts] requires the exercise of an informed judgment in the
balancing of all the interests of the states with the most significant contacts in
order best to accommodate the equities among the parties to the policies of those
states. 17
This quote was dicta, because the Court held that regardless of whether interest on
9. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
10. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
12. 28 U.S.C. §1652 (2000).
13. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,80 (1938).
14. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
15. Id. at 158.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 161-162.
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interest was allowable under any or all of the potentially interested states' laws, the
issue was determinable by reference to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act;' 8 that is,
there was "overruling federal law."' 9 Nevertheless, this case has been the point of
jumping off for much analysis. However, this analysis has not pointed in a clear
direct line.
It is to be noted that the Vanston Court, albeit in dicta, used a phrase to state
the essential choice of law relation that has similarly become basic in the
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Law ("Restatement of Conflicts"); they referred
to the "states with the most significant contacts, 2 ° whereas the core concept of the
Restatement of Conflicts is the "most significant relationship."'21 Because the latter,
in some version, appears in most states, and because the federal courts have
adopted the Restatement of Conflicts as the basis of federal common law choice of
law,22 it often happens that there is no essential difference in the choice of choice
of law- thus, the issue is left unresolved. This result was reached by the Fifth
Circuit in Woods Tucker Leasing Corporation v. Hutcheson-Ingram Development
Co.,23 where it held that Texas and Mississippi would apply the choice of law
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, as would the federal court, in making
24its own choice to recognize a contractual choice of law provision.
The Second Circuit reached a finer judgment in In re Gaston & Snow.25 The
case was a bankruptcy adversary proceeding on an oral contract between a Chapter
11 law firm and its former clients.26 At issue was the applicable statute of
limitations. 27 The court, after noting the division in the courts of appeals, held that
because federal choice of law rules are a creature of federal common law, and that
because federal common law was only available where there was a significant
federal interest, that where state law was the underlying dispositive law, the
bankruptcy courts should apply the choice of law rules of the forum and not federal
law.28
Reaching a directly contrary view is In re Vortex Fishing Systems, Inc. 29 That
case also involved a statute of limitations which lay at the basis of a claim on
which a creditor predicated its standing as an involuntary bankruptcy petitioner.30
18. Green, 329 U.S. at 161.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 162.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, cmit. c. (1971).
22. See, e.g., In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 262 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2001).
23. Woods Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutchison-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir.
1981).
24. Id. at 753-54.
25. In re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599 (2d. Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 601-02.
27. Id. at 604.
28. Id. at 605-07" see also Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013
(1953) (discussing that because Erie was partially based on the Rules of Decision Act, Erie also applied
in bankruptcy).
29. Vortex Fishing, 262 F.3d at 985.
30. Id. at 994-95.
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The case does not carefully discuss our issue but, following earlier circuit law,3 1
held that "[i]n a bankruptcy case, the court must apply federal choice of law
rules."32
Since most substantive rights in bankruptcy are based on state or non-
bankruptcy law, and since those state issues are respected in bankruptcy absent
federal bankruptcy statutes or strong, clear policies indicating otherwise,33 it would
seem that where state law prescribes the dispositive rule that Erie and the Rules of
Decision Act are controlling on the choice of law issue, then the forum's choice of
law rules would apply Otherwise, federal common law choice of law rules would
apply That is the position this article takes. I now turn to a brief discussion of
federal choice of law rules as applied when federal law is the dispositive rule. At
the end of the article I will briefly consider the choices made in some international
bankruptcy related state law issues.
B. Federal Choice of Law Brief History
The question addressed here is how to select between conflicting foreign and
federal bankruptcy law. In theory, the United States has the constitutional authority
to extend its legislation to the world. Thus, Bankruptcy Code section 541 expressly
provides that the estate created by filing a petition extends to all the described
property "wherever located and by whomever held. 34 There are, of course,
practical limits to this reach-the effect of American law on property located in
another country depends entirely on the willingness of the courts of that country to
recognize our claims or judgments.35
Partially in recognition of this practical limit, and partially as a matter of
conflict of laws policy, early on, the Supreme Court adopted the rule that:
[An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if
any other possible construction remains, and consequently can never be construed
to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted
by the law of nations as understood in this country.36
Chief Justice Marshall's language implicitly admits that the law of nations does not
limit the powers of Congress as set out in the U.S. Constitution as a matter of law
cognizable before U.S. courts, but rather is a matter of construction in the face of
general language.
Justice Joseph Story, a founder of American conflicts law, expressed this
same idea with a little more force in The Apollon,37 where he said: "[tjhe laws of
no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories, except so far as regards its
3 i. In re Lindsay, 59 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 1995).
32. Vortex Fishing, 262 F.3d at 994.
33. Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
34. 1i U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
35. See e.g., In re Int'l Admin. Serv., Inc., 211 B.R. 80 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
36. Alexander Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, i 18 (1804).
37 The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 370 (1824).
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own citizens. ' 8 Justice Story, in stating such, seemingly suggests that there were
real limits on a state's power under international law. The Marshall language has
prevailed.
In a case involving a Canadian insolvency, the Court held the American
creditors to the Canadian proceedings, saying: "[t]hat the laws of a country have no
extraterritorial force is an axiom of international jurisprudence, but things done in
one country under the authority of law may be of binding effect in another
country 0,39
The Charming Betsy case is generally looked at as a beginning since it at least
makes clear that courts are to use its guidance not as a limit on power where
Congress is clear, but as a rule of construction where Congress uses broad
boilerplate terms like "any" or "all.,
40
Perhaps the leading modern case is Lauritzen v. Larsen.4 1 Lauritzen was a
federal Jones Act 42 case, the facts of which center around a Danish seaman, who
signed on a Danish ship while the ship was in New York, and was later injured in
Cuba.43 He sought to assert his claim under the Jones Act, which facially allows
"any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
at his election, [to] maintain an action for damages "" While the Court noted
the reach of the actual language, it said: "[bly usage as old as the Nation, such
statutes have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which
American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of
international law."45 But this holding does not bind U.S. law"
On the contrary, we are simply dealing with a problem of statutory construction
rather commonplace in a federal system by which courts often have to decide
whether 'any' or 'every' reaches to the limits of the enacting authority's usual
scope or is to be applied to foreign events or transactions.
46
The Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to apply the Jones Act
remedies to a foreign sailor aboard a foreign ship, injured in a foreign port.
47
Some question about the presumption against extraterritoriality as a basis of
statutory construction was raised in the close 5-4 decision in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California.48 In that case, the Court, with two separate 5-4
majorities, applied the Sherman Act 4 9 to activities by English reinsurers in
38. Id.
39. Canadian Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883).
40. Id.
41. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
42. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000).
43. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 573.
44. Id. at 573 n. 1.
45. Id. at 577.
46. Id. at 577-79.
47. Id. at 592-93.
48. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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England.50 The majority on our issue simply held that since compliance with U.S.
law did not require the London reinsurers to violate English law, that is,
compliance would be legal in England, so there was no conflict of laws and U.S.
law could be applied.51 Justice Scalia, who wrote the dissent on this issue,52 used
the analysis followed here. The case does not really suggest there is any
qualification of this analysis, but the majority essentially ignored the real conflicts
issue presented: whether English law can be construed not to merely permit the
conduct prescribed by U.S. law, but to encourage the freedom of its insurance
companies to make such choices, at least while in England. This situation
classically calls for a conflicts analysis; Scalia does not offer a real conflict
analysis, but arguably his discussion is far superior to the simplistic analysis of the
majority.
Scalia, following the rules of statutory construction mentioned above, argued
that: (1) unless Congress indicates otherwise, federal legislation is only meant to
apply within the U.S. and (2) federal statutes should be construed, again where
possible, not to violate international law. 53 As a guide to these two canons of
construction, he mentioned that many lower courts in Antitrust cases had relied on
the doctrine of comity of nations and the rules outlined in the Restatement (Third)
Foreign Relations Law of the United States ("Restatement of Foreign
Relations").54
Comity is an older concept still viable in conflicts analysis, especially in
international cases. The classic statement associated with the concept of comity is
from Hilton v. Guyot,5 5 where the Court, in considering the enforceability of a
French judgment in federal courts, said:
'Comity, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of
mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the nghts of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws.
56
Obviously, the concept of comity is not a test or standard, but a guiding principle
of international cooperation. Moreover, it does not expressly, or to my mind
implicitly, give any guidance to a choice of law analysis. It addresses a style of
thinking which guides a court's attitude when offered the possibility that foreign
law should, by some choice of law principles, be applied. As vague as comity is, it
has continued to guide much of the thinking about foreign law in U.S. courts,
50. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 798-99.
5 1. Id. at 800.
52. Id. (Scalia also wrote for the majority on different issue).
53. Id. at 814-15.
54. See Suzanne Harrison, The Extraterritoriality of the Bankruptcy Code: Will the Borders
Contain the Code? 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 809 (1996).
55. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 122-23 (1895).
56. Id.
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including in bankruptcy proceedings, and plays a prominent role in determining
whether to grant relief in an ancillary proceeding.
57
Courts have found further guidance for the exercise of comity in the
provisions of the Restatement of Foreign Relations sections 402 and 403.5' Foreign
relations law in the Restatement includes "international law as it applies to the
United States., 59 As we have seen, this international law is not binding in the sense
that it overrides applicable federal statutes but serves as a canon of prudent
construction. Under section 402, a state has the jurisdiction to apply its law if it
chooses to do so, against:
(1) (a)conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its terrtory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its temtory that has or is intended
to have substantial effect within its territory; [and]
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as
within its territory.
60
But even where jurisdiction to prescribe is permitted under section 402, "a state
may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable. ' '6i Section 403(2) offers a nonexclusive list of relevant factors to be
applied where appropriate. These factors are:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e. the extent to
which the activity takes place within the temtory, or has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between
the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to
protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the
degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
57 1I U.S.C. § 304(c)(5).
58. RESTATMENT (THIRD) FOR. REL. §§ 402, 403 (1987).
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR. REL. § I(a). (1987).
60. Id. at § 403.
61. Id. at §403(l)(1987).
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(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
62
As a non-exclusive list of factors, this list is necessarily consistent with the
alternative approach of many courts, which simply state that "[t]he federal
common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation. 63 Notice that the Restatement of Foreign
Relations factors do not directly focus on choice of law, but rather determine the
reasonableness of the extension of federal law to a transaction or person having
foreign connections. If the U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction would be unreasonable,
federal law should not be applied, but a court need not chose the application of the
other state's law; indeed, this determination of unreasonableness logically results
in dismissal of the action.
Thus, while the Restatement factors are often treated as principles for
implementing comity, they actually focus on different questions. Comity (whatever
it means) focuses on whether to apply or defer to the foreign law, while the
Restatement delineates when American federal law should be limited or not
applied. Neither actually focuses on how to make the decision. This role is also
played, albeit vaguely by the greatest interest, or closest connection, or most
significant contact standard. But the courts have not developed this degree of
coherence, for the most part, in international insolvency A little history might
help.
62. RESTATMENT (THIRD) FOR. REL. § 403(2) (1987).
63. In re Koreag, Controlle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992) (not choosing
between federal common law choice of law and the forum (N.Y.) choice of law since they were
essentially the same); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1994),
aff'd 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y 1995) and 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) (on these important cases see
below).
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1II. PRE-1979 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES 64
Charles Booth describes a movement in international insolvency law in the
United States that shifts from territoriality to universality, back to territoriality, and
again to universality, prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.65 The early
cases basically ignore all conflict of laws analysis, and concentrate on the question
of the status of claims under a foreign insolvency proceeding. 66 This status inquiry
includes recognition of a foreign representative of an estate (more modem cases)
67
and whether the claims of a foreign assignee in a bankruptcy commission can be
recognized.
The earliest federal case was Harrison v. Sterry.68 This case involved a British
partnership which also did business under a firm name in South Carolina.69 The
contesting parties were the United States; attaching American and British creditors;
an assignee for the benefit of creditors, assignees in bankruptcy under a British
commission; and an American commission.7" The issue was the equitable division
of property. 7 The Court merely set a scheme for distribution. In so doing, Chief
Justice Marshall stated:
As the bankrupt law of a foreign country is incapable of operating a legal transfer
of property in the United States, the remaining two thirds of the fund are liable to
the attaching creditors, according to the legal preference obtained by their
attachments [thus subordinating the claims of the British bankruptcy assignees].
72
But having adopted this clear territorialist view, the Court went on to state that any
surplus left after the United States and the attaching creditors were paid "ought to
be divided equally among all the creditors, so as to place them on an equal footing
with each other.' '73 In doing so, the British and American bankruptcy distributions
should be taken into consideration.74 While not a pure universality approach, the
notion of equality of creditors is part of the rationale for universality
Perhaps a clearer case of subordination of foreign creditors, versus refusal to
64. This brief section is largely based on Charles D. Booth, A History of the Transnational
Aspects of United States Bankruptcy Law Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, B. U. INT'L L. J.
1(1991).
65. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
66. See text and cases in Part IV B below.
67 This issue is directly addressed as to ancillary proceedings in § 304 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. See below.
68. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. 289 (1809).
69. Id at 291-92.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 290.
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recognize, is In re Accounting of Waite.75 In Waite, the court recognized the claim
of a British trustee to property located in New York where no prejudice would be
done to local creditors by the transfer of the assets to England for administration.76
Judge Lowell recognized the developments as not involving conflict of laws
analysis:
We have no law of the situs giving preference to our creditors, but simply refuse
to interfere and aid the foreign trustee against the legal diligence of our creditors
who may have the good fortune to be able to attach or take in execution the effects
here before the trustee has removed them.
77
Thus, the notion of comity raised its head. It was not a choice of law problem-
which law should be applied-but a simple policy, which I have referred to as
subordination of the claims of the foreign trustee or estate representative, to the
claims of local U.S. creditors to assets located in the United States (a version of
territoriality).
A big step in the direction of the universality principle, which argues there
should be a single proceeding with equal treatment of the same class of creditors,
was taken in Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard.7 s In Gebhard, secured
bondholders of a Canadian railway company were subject to a Canadian scheme of
arrangement whereby the old bonds were to be exchanged for new bonds with a
longer maturity and lower interest rate.79 The scheme was approved by three-
quarters of the bondholders and the Canadian Parliament.8 Two dissenting New
York bondholders brought suit on their old bonds in the federal circuit court, which
held that the bondholders could recover on the old bonds.8' The Supreme Court
reversed.82 It reached several issues, but for our purposes it should be quoted for its
extensive endorsement of the essence of universality-
Unless all parties in interest, wherever they reside, can be bound by the
arrangement which it is sought to have legalized, the scheme may fail. All home
creditors can be bound. What is needed is to bind those who are abroad. Under
these circumstances the true spirit of international comity requires that schemes of
this character, legalized at home, should be recognized in other countries.
83
75. In re Accounting of Waite, 99 N.Y 433 (1885). The reader is reminded that during the
Nineteenth Century we had federal bankruptcy system for only about 17 years. Richard E. Coulson,
Consumer Abuse of Bankruptcy: An Evolving Philosophy of Debtor Qualification for Bankruptcy
Discharge, 62 AIb. L. Rev. 467, 471-477 (1998). During this period, most bankruptcies were state
based where inter-state bankruptcy issues were considered international, except where the federal Full
Faith and Credit Clause applied. Cf. John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments for
Creditors, I Harv. L. Rev. 259 260 (1888)).
76. In re Accounting of Waite, 99 N.Y 433,499-50 (1885).
77 Lowell, supra note 75, at 261.
78. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
79. Id. at 528-29.
80. Id. at 530.
81. Id. at 531.
82. Id. at 540.
83. Id. at 539.
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Implicitly this statement approved the application of Canadian law. Thus, like
many such cases involving the tension between territoriality and universality, the
choice of law is made by selecting a jurisdiction through the favorable application
of international comity Of course, international comity towards the law of a
similar common law nation is the easiest case. I will present that the similarity of
legal regimes has become a factor under Bankruptcy Code section 304.
The next case in this selective history is Hilton v. Guyot,i which has already
been mentioned in connection with its classic statement of comity.8 5 In Hilton, the
Court faced the question of the enforceability of a French judgment, by a French
liquidator, against two U.S. citizens on debts they owed to the liquidating firm. 6 In
addition to the statement of comity quoted above, the Court regressed to the
doctrine of territoriality when it said:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty from
which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation, as put in
force within its territory by judicial decree, shall by allowed to operate within
the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been
content to call "the comity of nations."
8 7
Using their understanding of the comity of nations, the Court adopted a rule of
reciprocity, where the French judgment would not be enforceable in the United
States because a U.S. judgment would not be enforceable in France.88
Skipping ahead to just before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197889 the
period described above and the intervening period were well characterized by
Booth when he wrote that "courts throughout the United States responded
inconsistently over the years to issues involving the recognition of foreign
insolvency proceedings and the claims of foreign representatives." 90 I would add
that they paid little attention to developing any coherent choice of law framework
for the solution in foreign insolvency matters. In the 1970s, there were a number of
big international cases which presaged many of the looming globalized
insolvencies, which we have and yet may see.
I will briefly mention two of these cases, only to illustrate the inadequacy of
the then existing Bankruptcy Act. The first of these cases was the insolvency of
84. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
85. See supra notes 55-59, and accompanying text.
86. Hilton, 159 U.S. at i14-21.
87. Id. at 163.
88. Most states do not require reciprocity concerning foreign judgments, and some authorities
think that federal courts must follow state law on this issue where the basis ofjurisdiction is diversity
including alienage. See Eugene F Scoles, et. al, Conflict of Laws at 1187ff (3d Ed. 2000). The
Restatement of Conflicts also does not require reciprocity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 98 and cmt. e. Many states accord foreign money judgments the essence of full faith and credit
via the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Id. at cmt. e, and 13 Uniform Laws
Anno. Pt. 1i p. 43 ff.
89. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
90. Booth, supra note 64, at 27.
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Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G. a. A. ("Herstatt"). 91 Its story is fascinatingly told in an
American Bar Association article by Joseph D. Becker.92 It is a tale of weaknesses
and doubts that fortunately led to a settlement (as confusion often does) and
avoided difficult decisions. Herstatt was a large West German private bank.93 It
had incurred large currency exchange losses as a result of the inflation generated
by the 1973 oil embargo.94 On June 26, 1974, the West German authorities ordered
the closing and liquidation of the bank. 95 Herstatt did not conduct any banking
business in the United States, but held accounts for cleanng purposes in Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.96 Chase froze the Herstatt account which had about $150
million, even though Chase's claims were only about $5 million.97 Attachments
against the Herstatt account with Chase began, and by mid-August, aggregated
about $200 million from American and foreign banks.98 Chase filed a federal
interpleader action interpleading the Herstatt account.99 Citibank, a nonattaching
creditor, then filed, on August 6, an involuntary bankruptcy petition designed to
wipe out the attachments as preferences.1°° Numerous legal issues were then
raised, including whether a foreign bank, which did not do banking business in the
United States, was excluded from coverage as an eligible debtor by the Bankruptcy
Act. 101 In such a case, the attachments could not be voidable preferences on the
assumption that U.S. preference law would apply, or whether it was an eligible
debtor, in which case the attachments were likely voidable. 10 2 On November 4,
1974, a bankruptcy judge heard this issue and others. 103 As Booth puts it, "[g]iven
the novelty and complexity of this issue, the inadequacy of the legal rules, as well
as the almost certain likelihood of appeal, the parties attempted to settle the matter
instead. ' ° 4 Settlement was shortly accomplished and the bankruptcy case was
dismissed. i 5
During the same period, an English bank called the Israel-British Bank
(London) Ltd. ("IBB"), had substantially identical problems.'0 6 On August 2, 1974,
it voluntarily commenced winding-up proceedings according to English law. 10 7 It
had bank accounts in U.S. banks, and attachments were levied against these
91. See Joesph D. Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290
(1976).
92. Id.





98. Id. at 1292.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1292-93.
101. Id..
102. See id. at 1291-93.
103. Id. at 1293
104. Booth, supra note 64, at 29.
105. Becker, supra note 91, at 1293-94.
106. Id.
107 Israel-British Bank (London), Ltd. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 511 (2d Cir.
1976); see also Becker, supra note 91, at 1293.
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accounts.108 Attempting to avoid these attachments, IBB voluntarily filed a
bankruptcy petition on September 23, 1974.109 Addressing the issue as to whether a
foreign bank not doing banking business in the United States was an eligible
debtor under the Bankruptcy Act,' i the bankruptcy court refused to dismiss, and
was reversed by the district court; the district court was in turn reversed by the
Second Circuit."' While the Second Circuit decided the question about a foreign
bank being an eligible debtor," 2 it did not need to use any choice of law analysis
because the case simply concerned a federal bankruptcy issue.
This broad survey of the pre-1979 state of the law leaves one in agreement
with Judge Lowell who wrote in 1888:
[l]n the present state of commerce and of communication, it would be better in
nine cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors
should be made in a single proceeding, and generally at a single place; better for
the creditors, who would thus share alike, and better for the debtor, because all his
creditors would be equally bound by his discharge. 113
Judge Lowell's statement does not reflect the even greater complexity of business
that exists today as compared to 1888, nor does it recognize the growing need for
reasonable, predictable rules of jurisdiction, recognition of foreign proceedings,
and choice of what law to apply to what issues. I will now briefly outline the
structural setting of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and some of its limited
choice of law implications, by looking at a few illustrative cases.
IV THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 19781 14
A. The Structure of Bankruptcy Code Section 304
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("BRA 1978") as amended, constitutes
the present Bankruptcy Code.' 15 In light of the history briefly mentioned above,
and other factors raised in the legislative history, the BRA 1978 made an approach
to what has come to be called "modified universality This concept means that
while the law leans towards the concept of a single plenary proceeding where all
creditors from all nations are treated somewhat equally (after all no system truly
treats all creditors equally-secured creditors, unsecured priority creditors, and
general unsecured creditors are not treated alike), the U.S. bankruptcy courts are
cautioned by the law to be careful in the recognition of foreign proceedings and to
108. Becker, supra note 91, at 1293.
109. Israel-British Bank, 536 F.2d at 511.
110. Id. at 511-12.
11. Id.
112. Id at 513.
113. Lowell, supra note 75, at 264.
114. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
115. The present Code is codified in sections of I I U.S.C.
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give some protection to U.S. creditors.' 
1 6
Under the BRA 1978, as Arnold M. Quittner has noted, 1 7 a foreign debtor
has essentially four options for pursuing assets located in the United States."1
8
First, it may voluntarily begin a chapter 7 or chapter II proceeding, provided it is
an eligible debtor under Bankruptcy Code section 109(a), which usually requires
that the debtor has a place of business or property in the U.S." 9 Second, if the
foreign debtor is in a foreign insolvency proceeding outside the United States, 20 its
foreign representative 12 1 may file an involuntary proceeding under Bankruptcy
Code section 303(b)(4).122 Third, the foreign representative may also file an
ancillary proceeding subject to the conditions stated in Bankruptcy Code section
304.123 Finally under general standards of international comity, the foreign
representative or the foreign debtor may seek the assistance of U.S. state or federal
courts to claim its property and transfer it to another country 124 Indeed, in the
absence of creditors pursuing such property locally, the debtor could just see to the
transfer, while a foreign representative would seem to need judicial assistance.
Judicial assistance is likely to be expensive if the foreign debtor has property
located in more than one U.S. jurisdiction. 125
This section briefly outlines the variety of U.S. proceedings where foreign
claims concerning an international debtor's estate can face a U.S. court. I am going
to deal primarily with situations where there are either: (1) two plenary bankruptcy
proceedings pending, one abroad and one in the U.S., or (2) a plenary bankruptcy
proceeding pending abroad and an ancillary proceeding pending in the U.S.
Analytically there is no choice of law difference, except to the extent that the
Bankruptcy Code section 304 factors implicate choice of law considerations.
Bankruptcy Code section 304 applies to ancillary proceedings, 26 but its
factors have been applied more generally where two plenary proceedings are
116. Id.
117 Arnold M. Quittner, Introduction to and Overview of Cross-Border Insolvency Issues, p.2
(2003) (unpublished article on file with the author and the editors).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. A "foreign proceeding" is defined as a "proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and
whether or not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence,
principal place of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding,
for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or
effecting a reorganization. II U.S.C. § 101(23) (2000).
121. A "foreign representative" is defined as a "duly selected trustee, administrator, or other
representative of an estate in foreign proceeding. Id. at § 101(24).
122. II U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (2000).
123. II U.S.C. § 304 (2000)
124. Quitnner supra note 117, at 29 ff.
125. In addition to Quittner id., see also Lynn P Harrison, Ill, Ancillary Proceedings Under the
United States Bankruptcy Code: A Primer in 2 23rd Annual Current Developments in Bankruptcy and
Reorganization p. 175, 185 (P.L.I. 2001). Cf. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico,
S.A., 44 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1994) (where Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to consider
whether international comity called for deference to Mexican suspension proceedings).
126. I1 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2000).
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pending. For my purposes, section 304 is interesting for its choice of law
implications; it is about the only legislative guidance available showing where
Congress has chosen to articulate factors involved in a choice of whether to grant
relief. Thus, I will first outline the structure and factors of choice in section 304.
A "case ancillary to a foreign proceeding" is begun by a foreign
representative filing a petition. 127 Subsection (b) specifically authorizes the
bankruptcy court to enjoin "any action against (i) a debtor with respect to property
involved in such foreign proceeding or (ii) such property; or (B) the enforcement
of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or any act, or the
commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a
lien against the property of such estate." 12S The territorial nature of this assistance
is clear, as it authonzes a stay against actions concerning "the property involved in
such foreign proceeding[s]" "such property, or "the property of such estate."' i29
The subsection goes on to authorize an order requiring the turnover "of the
property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property" to the foreign
representative. 30 Notice that the property is treated as property of an estate, but
this estate cannot be an estate created by federal bankruptcy law because that estate
under Bankruptcy Code section 541 (a) is only created by filing a petition under
sections 301, 302, or 303, not 304. 3i Also note that in an ancillary case, there is no
automatic stay* instead, it is only triggered by a petition under the same three
sections. 132 The subsection finally authorizes the court to "order other appropriate
relief."' 3 3 This provision clearly provides far reaching authority which, when
coupled with section 105(a), 34 allows the court to be most accommodating where
the factors to be considered under section 304(c) warrant.
Code section 304(c) says that "[in determining whether to grant relief under
subsection (b) the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical
and expeditious administration of such estate" consistent with six factors listed
therein. 35 Notice again that the estate with which the court should concern itself
must be the foreign estate, because no domestic estate exists in an ancillary
proceeding. 136 The factors, not explicitly exclusive, in statutory order are:
(1) "just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;"
(2) "protection of claims holders in the United States against prejudice and
inconvenience;"
(3) "prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property-"
127. II U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000).
128. Id. at § 304(b)(I)(emphasis added).
129. Id at § 304(b)(2).
130. Id. at § 362(a).
131. Id. at § 304(b)(3).
132. Id. at §362(a).
133. Id. at § 304(b)(3) and text at note 131.
134. "The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
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(4) "distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with
the order prescribed by this title;"
(5) "comity" and
(6) "if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for
[an] individual." 137
It is noteworthy that comity merely appears as the fifth of six factors, which
are not arranged in any discernable order. It is as if comity was an afterthought, or
is merely one of several equal considerations. Some courts have so treated it, but
other courts have considered comity the paramount factor, with the other five
factors designated to carry it out.138 As I have demonstrated, comity is largely a
matter of political sensitivity in international relations with no particular structure.
Perhaps, in the future, it is sufficient if courts develop a federal common law of
comity, with content similar to developed choice of law principles.
The other factors, seen as attempting to guide the choice of relief to be
accorded, may be an advance. The problem is that it is unclear as to the goal of
factorial inquiry We are told that the court is to seek the economical and
expeditious administration of the foreign estate. This goal must be achieved
consistent with comity and the other factors. Is the court to apply foreign law or
domestic law9 How do you balance "just treatment of all holders" 139 of claims or
interests against the protection of U.S. claim holders against prejudice and
inconvenience? And, what does it mean to require distribution of the foreign estate
"substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title?"' 4  As
Professor Buxbaum has put it:
Unfortunately, section 304 does not incorporate a pnncipled choice-of-law
approach. There are two distinct areas in which the absence of a conflicts method
is apparent. First, Section 304 does not instruct courts to consider the interests,
relative or absolute, of the United States and any foreign jurisdiction in the
application of their respective laws to the bankruptcy proceeding. In other words,
a local proceeding initiated by a small local creditor when the debtor and all other
creditors are located in a single foreign junsdiction is not distinguished from a
local proceeding brought by a large group of U.S. creditors when the debtor has
major local operations and other substantial contacts with the United States.
14 1
Indeed, the 304 factors do not consider the foreign interests at all, except to the
extent they are considered via the single word "comity
My purpose is not, however, to review the courts struggle to apply the factors.
As is often the case with legislation, which does not fully address a problem, the
courts are occasionally very creative in dealing with these often complex
questions, but are also sometimes very parochial in a biased application of U.S.
law. I will now turn to a few selected cases to illustrate the law in action.
137 11 U.S.C. § 304(c).
138. See Harrison, supra note 125, at 10-13.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(I).
140. Id. at § 304(c)(4).
141. Buxbaum, supra note 2, at 32.
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B. Selected Cases
An early case under BRA 1978 was In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd.142 In a
back handed manner, this case essentially decided that Canadian bankruptcy law
would not be applied to a garnishment lien claimed in a fund then in the clerk's
office of a Michigan state court. 4 3 There is no conflicts analysis, little discussion
of Bankruptcy Code section 304 factors, and a rigid application of section
304(c)(4).14 Here, an American creditor had contracts with the debtor as an
exclusive sales representative for auto parts from three major automobile
manufacturers. 145 Alleging withheld commissions, the creditor sought arbitration
and eventually secured two arbitration awards. 146 Meanwhile, Toga's major
secured creditor took control of its business and assets and appointed a receiver.
147
The arbitration awards were confirmed by order of a Michigan state court, and
writs of garnishment were served on the three automobile manufacturers.i48 The
secured creditor intervened in the garnishment proceedings, claiming that the
funds, eventually ordered paid into the court, were subject to its prior perfected
security interest in Toga's accounts receivable. 149 The state court found the secured
party's security interest was superior to the garnishment liens, and directed the
funds be paid to the Canadian receiver. 150 The American creditor appealed and was
granted a stay 15 A few months later, an unsecured creditor filed an involuntary
bankruptcy petition in Canada. 152 The Canadian receiver was appointed trustee in
Canada, and brought an ancillary proceeding under section 304 in the Eastern
District of Michigan, seeking a stay and the turnover of the garnished funds.
53
Applying Canadian law, the court found the fund was property of the
Canadian bankruptcy estate. 154 It then addressed the question of what effect should
be given to claims based on Canadian law to property located in the United
States. 155 The court simply starts on the wrong foot.
Citing Harrison v. Sterry156 and Odgen v. Saunders,157 the court opined that
"[h]istorically, the bankruptcy laws of our country have been hostile toward claims
asserted by foreign trustees in bankruptcy against alleged property located in the
142. In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
143. Id. at 170-71.
144. See id
145. Id. at 165-66.





151. Id. at 166-67.
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id. at 166-67.
154. Id. at 167
155. Id. at 166.
156. Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. 289 (1809).
157 Odgen v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213 (1827) (not dealing with an international insolvency but with
an interstate matter).
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United States." '  Not cited, and hence ignored, was Gebhard,159 which bound
domestic bondholders to a Canadian proceeding on the clear universalist attitude of
more recent law.16° Of course, the court was not without support in other uncited
cases. But, the court seemed to ignore the universalist factors in section 304. When
it turned to section 304 it listed the subsection (c) factors and discussed some of
them. 16' Although holding that the American creditor "would receive just treatment
of its claim against Toga in the Canadian courts,"'162 it did not discuss the balance
for which this factor calls. Section 304(c) does not merely call for just treatment of
the American creditor, 63 but for the "just treatment of all holders of claims
against such estate. ' 'i 64 This treatment is the universalist notion of a single
proceeding with equality of treatment of all creditors. The court's mistake appears
when it concludes that the American creditor will not receive distribution
"substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title." 165 It reaches
this conclusion because the American creditor, held by the Michigan state trial
court to be a subordinated secured creditor, would be considered unsecured under
Canadian law 266 Thus, the court construes section 304(c)(4) as requiring treatment
for an American creditor by the foreign law very similar to that accorded by U.S.
law. 167 I submit that is not what this subsection requires.
In the first place, if section 304(c)(4) requires substantially identical treatment
of individual creditors under both laws, there is never a role for conflict of laws.
This approach is the forum law approach, where the forum always applies its own
law. Secondly, the language of the rule requires the distribution of estate proceeds
be in accord "with the order prescribed by"2168 title 11 -not that each creditor be
treated in the same class that it would be under U.S. law. Whether a creditor is
secured or not depends upon the applicable law; applicable law is a choice of law
issue. For example, while in the United States most states follow the Uniform
Commercial Code on the attachment and perfection of consensual security interests
and its choice of law rules,' 69 the broader rule of the Restatement of Conflicts
provides that for chattels, the law of the state with the most significant relationship
applies, and that is generally, in the absence of an effective choice, the law of the
"location of the chattel at the time that the security interest attached." 70 The
"order" of distribution is a matter of bankruptcy law. I think, Toga reflects
158. Toga, 28 B.R. at 167.
159. Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
160. Id.
161. Toga, 28 B.R. at 166.
162. Id.
163. It does call for the Amencan court to protect against "prejudice and inconvenience. I I U.S.C.
§ 304(c) (2000).
164. Id.
165. Toga, 28 B.R. at 169.
166. Id. at 168-69.
167. Id.
168. 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4) (2000).
169. See id. § 9-301(1) (1998) (which generally adopts the law of the debtor's location to issues of
perfection and priority).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 251 (1971).
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inattention to the issue actually presented, whether turning the money over to the
Canadian trustee would lead to the economical and expeditious administration
consistent with a distribution of proceeds, not substantially dissimilar to the order
provided in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.17 1 It does not call for every creditor to fall
within the distribution order that U.S. law provides.
Another case with a territorial bias is Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the
M/V Venture Star 172 This case has more of a choice of law aspect. KKL Kangaroo
Lines (KKL) was an Australian shipping company 173 Wah Kwong owned ship
leasing companies in Hong Kong, which leased ships to KKL. 174 Involuntary
liquidation proceedings were initiated by Wah Kwong in Australia. 175 At the time,
KKL had property in the United States, including certain freight monies and the
proceeds of a pending arbitration between KKL and Weyerhauser Company 176 A
Liquidator was appointed by the Australian courts. 177 In pre-liquidation
transactions, KKL assumed the business of another company and agreed to pay its
creditors. 178 The other company transferred the arbitration claim to KKL, and KKL
received a $6 million loan from a Wah Kwong subsidiary secured by an
assignment of the arbitration rights. 179 The relationship of the parties was complex
and the repayment terms unclear.180 The KKL's business deteriorated and it
subsequently ceased doing business.18 1 Wah Kwong went into receivership. 8 2 Two
agreements were entered into between various parties, including the KKL
Liquidator and certain Wah Kwong subsidiaries. 8 3 The agreements essentially
provided that the proceeds of the arbitration would be paid to the Liquidator, who
would then pay a Wah Kwong subsidiary the first $6 million, while the rest would
be held for the Australian bankruptcy. 18 4 These agreements were approved by the
Australian court apparently without notice to the U.S. creditors.
18 5
The Liquidator petitioned for ancillary proceedings under section 304 in the
District of New Jersey Bankruptcy Court.18 6 Then, various petitioning creditors
filed an involuntary chapter 7 petition in the Central District of Californma. 87 The
District Court for New Jersey entered an order which stayed all actions against the
171. The order provided in the Bankruptcy Code is: secured creditors, priority creditors, unsecured
creditors, and equity owners.
172. Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373, 374 (D.N.J. 1988).








181. Id. at 376.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 375.
185. Id. at 376.
186. Id. at 375.
187. InterpoolLtd., 102 B. R. at 375.
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debtor, withdrew to the District Court the reference of the 304 petition,
consolidated all actions in that court, and appointed a receiver to collect the
outstanding freights and pay them to the Court Registry.'88 Shortly thereafter, the
bankruptcy court in California transferred the chapter proceeding to the New
Jersey district court. 89 The reported decision involved the Liquidator's motion to
dismiss the chapter 7 proceeding.190
The court says that "[t]here is no requirement that Australian law and United
States law be identical."' 91 As I will show, it is hard not to agree with Charles
Booth. In discussing Interpool on this point Booth says, "[t]his assertion to the
contrary, the Interpool opinion, in effect, sets forth the requirement that for section
304 relief to be granted, the foreign law must be identical to the U.S. law."'
192
The court starts out reviewing Australian liquidation law and concludes that
"access to Australian courts relating to actions of the Liquidator is not
restricted."' 193 But, the court noted that briefs, affidavits, and testimony indicated
that creditors could not seek to set aside the Liquidator's agreements concerning
the arbitration proceeds. 194 The court then said that "[pirotection of United States
creditors is of utmost importance to this Court. Actions taken by a foreign court in
a foreign bankruptcy are to be given deference if, and only if there would be no
substantial violation of the law that would be applied in the United States."' 9 5
Looking at section 304, the court ordered the petition granted: "this Court
must be convinced that the foreign Court has or will abide by fundamental
standards of procedural fairness. 'i 96 Then, referring to the Federal Rules, of
Bankruptcy Procedure, the court noted that they required notice to creditors "prior
to the institutionalization of agreements between the trustee and any of the
creditors, and that the "trustee and creditors hold a series of meetings."' 197 The
court finally concluded:
Since, in this case, the creditors were not notified prior to the date the Court
ratified the agreement between the Liquidator and Wah Kwong, this Court
finds that the procedural protections available to creditors in the United States
were not iven to the United States creditors in Australia. This is a serious
omission.
Of perhaps more importance, the court found that the doctrine of equitable
188. Id.
189. Id. at375, fn. 3.
190. iI U.S.C. § 305(a)(2)(B) (2000).
191. Interpool Ltd., 102 B.R. at 378.
192. Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the
Inconsistent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AMER. BANKR. L. J. 135, 204 (1992) (emphasis in
original).
193. Interpool Ltd., 102 B.R. at 378.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
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subordination was not available in Australia and might be implicated in the
Liquidator's agreement with Wah Kwong.' 99 Therefore, the court concluded that
"[b]oth the laws and the public policy of the United States will be violated if the
case is permitted to proceed under Australian law Foreign trustees will be able
to enter into any type of agreements as long as United States law, notions of due
process, and equitable treatment of creditors are followed in a similar fashion in
foreign jurisdictions.
' 200
Consequently, the court denied the section 304 petition and granted the
chapter 7 petition.20 Agam, there is a total failure to undertake anything but a
territorial analysis. There is no serious conflict analysis, nor is the statutory
injunction concerning economical and expeditious administration discussed. The
court fails to note the inherent conflict left where U.S. law claims the worldwide
assets of KKL are property of the U.S. bankruptcy estate in the chapter 7
proceeding. Indeed, the court mistakenly says that "[a]ll of the assets located in
the United States, including, but not limited to the proceeds of the [arbitration]
claims, shall be considered part of the bankrupt estate. ,202 Why the arbitration
claims are considered located within the U.S. is not mentioned, nor are conflict of
laws issues concerning the validity of the various foreign claims to the arbitration
proceeds. Booth points out a number of Australian protections for creditors which,
while different, would be weighed in any choice of law analysis considenng the
interests of the various states.20 3 Finally, there is no recognition that there remains
a choice of law question-whether Bankruptcy Code section 510 on equitable
subordination is the proper law to apply to a transaction between a foreign
liquidator, an alleged insider, a foreign debtor with property in the United States,
which was entered into abroad. It seems that while the district court reached a
decision, the rationale had little to do with principles capable of reaching a
predictable, fair, and economical result in an international insolvency.
The next case I survey demonstrates a far better use of section 304 and
includes a little choice of law analysis. In In re Culmer 204 Judge Lifland dealt with
a petition under section 304 by Bahamian liquidators of a Bahamian bank
("BAOL"). 20 5 BAOL's banking license was suspended in the Bahamas on July 16,
1982.206 On August 16, a stockholder's resolution called for the winding-up of the
firm, and a court-supervised liquidation was commenced in the Bahamas on that
day 207 On September 8, the section 304 petition for ancillary relief was filed.208 In
addition, the bankruptcy court issued two temporary restraining orders on that day
and on the 10th, which stayed actions against BAOL or its property in the United
199. Id..
200. ld. at 380.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Charles D. Booth, supra note 192, at 206-07
204. In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y 1982).
205. Id. at 622.
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States2" This property was in various forms, but centered on accounts in various
U.S. financial institutions.2"1 The U.S. creditors were largely claiming under ex
parte attachments or setoffs,
21' and some opposed granting the prayed for relief.
21 2
The relief requested was to stay the commencement or continuation of all actions
against BAOL's property in the United States, and require the turnover of all
property to the Bahamian proceedings.2' 3
The court discussed the progress of the Bahamian proceedings and found
them to be "inherently fair and regular., 21 4 The issues were largely discussed on
the implicit assumption that the choice was to defer to the Bahamian proceedings
and the assumed application of Bahamian law to all issues, or to dismiss the
section 304 proceeding and let the American courts apply American law 215 The
court does not really address this issue, which detracts from an otherwise fine
opinion.
The court seriously addressed the section 304(c) factors essentially treating
them as aspects of international comity 216 The court recognized the universalist
direction of section 304 by stating: "[ilt is this Court's opinion based upon the
wording and legislative history of section 304 that the central examination which it
must undertake in order to comply with Section 304(c) is whether the relief
petitioners seek will afford equality of distribution of the available assets. 2 t7 In
addressing comity, the court not only quoted the oft-quoted definition in Hilton v.
Guyot,2 18 but quoted New York cases, which state the exceptions to comity more
narrowly- "foreign-based rights should be enforced unless the judicial enforcement
of such a [right] would be the approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious,
wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense. 219
Applying this strong notion of comity, the court examined Bahamian
insolvency law and found it generally in accord with U.S. concepts, even though
the Bahamian notion of priority claimants is not the same as that in the United
States. 220 Thus, in some cases, American creditors would not be given the same






214. Id. at 627.
215. Id. at 627-29
216. Id. at 629 ("All of the factors listed in Section 304(c) have historically been considered within
a court's determination whether to afford comity to proceeding in a foreign nation ").
217. Id. at 628.
218. Hilton, 159U.S. at 164.
219. Culmer 25 B.R. at 629 (quoting from lnt'l Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212
(N.Y 1964) as quoted in Comfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv., Ltd., 471 F.Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y
1979)). Interestingly, Golden was case dealing with a foreign gambling contract and the actual word
used by the New York court where Culmer shows "[right]" was "contract" which was changed to
"[right]" by the district court in Comfeld. Cornfeld, 471 F Supp. at 1259. It is possible that
international comity owes less respect to foreign law than to a foreign contract.
220. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 628-29.
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factor analysis under section 304(c) and concluded "that affording comity would
not violate American law or public policy Whether or not Bahamian law is
identical in application to American law, there is nothing inherently vicious,
wicked, immoral or shocking to the prevailing moral sense in the Bahamian laws
outlined above."22 '
Finally and most important to the themes of this article, the court briefly
addressed the reason that the Bahamian law should be applied to the instant
transactions.222 The court said:
Moreover, the Bahamas has by far the greatest interest in BAOL's liquidation
since neither the United States nor the State of New York has any governmental or
public interest in BAOL's liquidation. In contrast, only a handful of creditors
who have purported to obtain preferences in this district have opposed transferring
all of BAOL's assets for distribution in the Bahamian liquidation. This court is
thus not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving American and foreign
attachment creditors over the policy favonng uniform administration in a foreign
court.
2 23
This analysis is not a detailed choice of law analysis, but it is an improvement
on the apparent dichotomy between deferring or dismissing. It adds measurably to
the section 304(c) factors, which call for weighing some of the relevant factors, but
ignores the weighing of the competing legal interests, which seek to choose the law
of the nation with the greater interest. Admittedly, choice of law analysis has not
reached anything approaching a litmus test; however, neither has most law. The
choice of law analysis would also suggest using the distinction between
jurisdiction, which section 304 primarily addresses, albeit with substantive
concerns, and applicable law. For instance, nothing in the law of nations requires
American courts to insist on leaving assets in the United States for administration
in order to get to consider the American notion of equitable subordination.224 Is the
lack of such a doctrine inherently vicious, wicked, immoral, or shocking? More
importantly might the Australian court in Interpool 225consider applying the
American doctrine in the case before it? This question is the type of choice of law
done daily in domestic and other international areas of law Why not international
insolvency 9 In fact, it is done in international insolvency cases by a properly
focused court, albeit not always with the clearest approach. To focus more directly
I now turn to a grand case.
In early 1996, before the Second Circuit's decision in In re Maxwell
Communication Corporation,226 but after the district court's affirmance227 of the
bankruptcy court's granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 228 Jay
221. Id. at 631.
222. Id. at 629.
223. Id. at 629.
224. See interpool Ltd. V Certain Freights of the MN Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988).
225. Id.
226. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.3d 788 (2d Cir. 1996).
227. In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (Judge Scheindlin).
228. In re Maxwell Communication Corporation, 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1994) (Judge
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Lawrence Westbrook wrote: "[tihe Maxwell case as a whole is one of the most
important transnational insolvencies of modem times., '229 This judgment has not
needed to change with the passage of seven years-at least in reported cases. The
very interesting facts are well presented in the three opinions. I will only lightly
sketch the facts important to my use of the case for choice of law purposes. In so
doing, I follow the Second Circuit's factual presentation.
Robert Maxwell was a media magnate with his activities centered in England,
but with international holdings.230 His death led to the bankruptcy of the Maxwell
Communication Corporation plc, an English corporation ("Maxwell"). 231 While
most of Maxwell's debt was incurred in England, eighty percent of its assets were
located in the United States. 232 These assets included Macmillan, Inc. and other
entities. 233 On December 16, 1991, Maxwell filed a chapter I I petition. 234 The next
day, it petitioned the High Court of Justice in London for an administration order,
the closest equivalent in British law to Chapter II relief.235 With two large
multiparty proceedings pending in England and the United States,236 the two courts
did a remarkable thing-they cooperated m a sophisticated manner. Judge
Brozman appointed an examiner:
[The examiner was] to investigate the debtor's financial condition, to function as a
mediator among the various parties, and to 'act to harmonize, for the benefit of all
of [Maxwell's] creditors and stockholders and other parties in interest,
[Maxwell's] United States chapter 11 case and [Maxwell's] United Kingdom
administration case so as to maximize [the] prospects for rehabilitation and
reorganization.
' 23 7
More remarkably, the two courts approved a protocol between the Examiner and
the Administrators.238 In light of the protocol, Judge Brozman recognized the
Administrators as the corporate governance of the debtor-in-possession in the
United States, and the English judge granted the Examiner leave to appear in the
English proceedings. 239 The parties worked together to develop a plan for
reorganization and a scheme of arrangement (hereinafter, collectively referred to as
the "Plan") as interdependent documents which were filed for approval in both
countries. 240 The Plan treats all of the world-wide assets as a pool under the control
Brozman)
229. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 FORDHAM L. REV
2531,2534 (1996); In re Maxwell Communications Corp.,93 F.3d 1036, 1041 (2d Cir. 1996).
230. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1041 (2d Cir. 1996).
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of Maxwell for distribution.24' It basically pays the secured creditors and holders of
priority claims in full.
242
Three banks, subjects of the instant preference actions, filed claims with the
Administrators. 243 One of these banks had sought an anti-litigation injunction in
England. 244 After receiving an ex parte order, the injunction was vacated by the
English court.245 In the U.S. case, the Administrators then commenced adversary
proceedings against the three banks for the recovery of allegedly preferential
transfers.2
As might be expected in large international transactions, the transfers were
complex. The three banks were: Barclays Bank plc, and National Westminster
Bank plc, both headquartered in London with branches in New York, and Societe
Generale, a French bank with headquarters in Paris and offices in London and New
York.247 Barclays and National Westminster had separately negotiated overdraft
facilities in London.248 When an extension on the overdraft became past due,
Barclays pressured Maxwell into making a $30 million payment from proceeds of
the sale of a Macmillan subsidiary. 249 These proceeds, on deposit in a Maxwell
account at the New York branch of National Westminster, were transferred to
Maxwell's dollar account with National Westminster in London, and from there, to
Barclays New York branch, and then credited to Maxwell's overdraft account in
London.250 Other similar transfers were also alleged.i
In National Westminster's case, Maxwell had sold another Macmillan
subsidiary for $145 million. 252 These dollars had been deposited with Citibank in
New York, from which they were transferred to a Maxwell account with Citibank
in London.253 Maxwell then purchased British pounds and used some of these to
deposit in an account it had at National Westminster's London branch. 25 4 The
deposit was then used to pay down the overdraft facility 255 Another similar set of
transfers were made to National Westminster.
256
Societe Generale had negotiated a loan in London with Maxwell. 25 7 Maxwell
made a payment of $10 million in pounds by transferring the pounds from another
241. id.
242. See E. Bruce Leonard, Breakthroughs in Court-to-court Communications in Cross-border
Cases, A.B.I. J. vol. 20 no. 7, 18 (Sept. 2001)( for more on the use of cooperation).
243. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1043 (2d Cir. 1996).
244. Id at 1042-43.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1043.
247. Id. at 1040.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1040-41.
251. Id.
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account maintained in London to Societe's branch in London. 25 8 Although the
details of this transaction were unclear, the district court assumed these funds had
also come from the sale of one of the Macmillan subsidiaries.259
All of the actual transfers to the banks had been made within ninety days
preceding the chapter 11 filing.260 Despite the close cooperation and judicial
approval of the plan and scheme, neither court addressed the question of what law
would be applied in any avoidance actions. While there are many similarities
between U.S. and English preference rules, there was one large difference that
apparently would decide the instant actions.26' Under the English Insolvency Act
of 1986,262 preference avoidance requires that the debtor intends the transfers to
place the transferee in a better position.263 Of course, this subjective element is
absent from present U.S. preference law. A classic choice of law issue was
presented and so treated by Judge Brozman of the bankruptcy court through the
circuit court. They are to be commended.
What did they decide? They decided the English preference law was the
applicable law after seriously engaging in a proper choice of law analysis. 264 This
case was not an ancillary proceeding case, so the section 304 factors were not
directly applicable.265 Instead, the Second Circuit started with international comity,
citing the usual cases, but adding from Hilton:
[l]nternational law, including questions arising under what is usually
called private international law, or the conflict of laws, and concerning the rights
of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts,
private or public, done within the dominions of another nation, is part of our
law.
266
The court noted that comity does not limit sovereignty, but aids construction of the
law. 26 7 Essentially, in the absence of a clear congressional command, conflict of
laws rules guide the determination of what law to apply 268 As always, the conflict
of laws of the forum is determinative.
The court considered section 403 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
discussed above. While these are textual rules limiting the state's jurisdiction to
prescribe, the Court said that the "factors enumerated in the Restatement
correspond to familiar choice-of-law principles, ' 269 and specifically referred by
parenthetical quotation from another Second Circuit case that the "rule is to apply
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 1040-41.
261. See id. at 1051.
262. Id. at 1043.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 104147
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1047, quoted in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
267. Id. at 1046-47
268. Id. at 1047
269. Id. at 1048.
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the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation."27 Thus,
they rapidly developed comity into consideration of the Restatement of Foreign
Relations and equated that in essence to the "greatest interest" rubric.
27'
The court then rejected a number of tenuous, but plausible, textual arguments
for the proposition that Congress had expressed itself.272 The court specifically
rejected the notion, implicit in many lower court cases-that "the Bankruptcy
Code always applies, comity notwithstanding, when a bankruptcy case has been
properly commenced, and that choice-of-law analysis is never appropriate in a
bankruptcy case.,, 2 7' The court rejected this notion because it could find no code-
based language supporting that broad proposition and rejected the interpretation
proffered by two older cases.274
It next considered the "false conflict" analysis suggested by the Supreme
Court in its narrow decision applying American anti-trust law to activities in
England, on the basis that the conduct prescribed by American anti-trust law was
not illegal in England in Hartford Fire Insurance,275 discussed above. It did so by
closely analyzing the scope and purposes of avoidance rules.276 Essentially, the
court properly recognized that the purpose of preference rules is to try to more
closely assure that the estate of an insolvent debtor is equitably distributed by
avoiding certain transactions shortly before bankruptcy, and sharing the avoided
transfers with creditors as a whole.277 As such, "a conflict between two avoidance
rules exists if it is impossible to distribute the debtor's assets in a manner
consistent with both rules., 278 Thus, it avoided the snare of "false conflicts" that
often confuses courts in ordinary cases, both where a conflict is not real, and where
it is real (if you look closely at related rules like distribution to creditors).
Finally the court undertook a careful weighing of interests in traditional
conflict of laws fashion. 2 79 It noted that the debtor, and most creditors, were
British.280 While the funds had a transient location briefly in the United States (if
today monies in deposit accounts are located anywhere other than via an artificial
legal rule 281 ), and may have been proceeds of sales of U.S. assets, these factors did
270. Id. Second quotation is from In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. v. Refco F/X Assocs.,
961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992).
27 1. See Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of
the Twentieth Century, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 571 (1999) (for more on the globalization of the greatest
interest or most significant relation including contacts and policies at least in contract choice of law
cases).
272. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996).
273. Id. at 1049.
274. See id. at 1048-49.
275. Id. at 1049-50.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1050.
279. Id. at 1051.
280. Id.
281. Cf. Rev. U.C.C. § 9-304 (local law of bank's jurisdiction governs perfection of security
interest in a deposit account).
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not particularly weigh in favor of applying U.S. avoidance law 282 The court
emphasized that not applying U.S. law was, in part, affected by the fact that these
assets had been sold as going concerns with no discemable effects on local
economies. 28 3 The court stated:
The principal policies underlying the Code's avoidance provisions are equal
distribution to creditors and preserving the value of the estate through the
discouragement of aggressive pre-petition tactics causing dismemberment of the
debtor. These policies are effectuated, although in a somewhat different way, by
the provisions' [§ 547] British counterpart.
2
8
The decisions (including those of the district and bankruptcy courts) are a
refreshing approach to the choice of law dilemma; they recognized that the
decision was properly analyzed based on choice of law principles, sought guidance
in the policies of the Code, and sought to follow the paltry prior guidance of the
Supreme Court. Jay Westbrook disagrees somewhat arguing for the application of
the home country's avoidance rules. Westbrook admits that, in Maxwell, the home
country was arguable and that a particularized application of choice of law analysis
might have been the only way out.28 5 I am not averse to a true universalist regime
where the proper forum would be selected by some rule, and that state's law
applied; however, I am more sympathetic to the notion that traditional choice of
law principles seek to allocate interests and policies as they best fit a particularized
case. Perhaps, the actual conflict is between principles of treating creditors alike,
and treating an individual creditor justly, a substantive accommodation will be
needed and found. I tend to believe, for now, that the common law choice of law
approach will better inform our eventual collective judgment.
Not discussed by the Second Circuit is whether New York or federal choice
of law rule should be applied. Maybe there was no salient difference, or maybe, as
seems the case, federal rules were assumed to apply 286 The bankruptcy court
applied federal common law.28 7 This issue was better considered by the Second
Circuit in the next case.
In Koreag, Controle Et Revision S.A. v. Refco FIXAssociates, Inc.,288 the court
faced the question of how to decide whether property located in the United States
is property of the foreign bankruptcy estate. 289 Koreag was the official liquidator of
Mebco Bank S.A., a Swiss bank.2 90 Refco was a New York commodity and
291currency corporation. Prior to Mebco being placed into liquidation by Swissauthorities on April 27 1989, Mebco and Refco engaged in extensive currency
282. See In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1051 (2d Cir. 1996).
283. id.
284. Id. at 1052.
285. Westbrook, supra note 229, at 2541.
286. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
287. Id. at 1042-43
288. See In re Koreag, Controle et Revisone S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992).
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transactions. 292 Typically, and especially in the instant dispute, the parties used an
account in the Swiss Bank-NY (the "Account") through which currency
transactions cleared. 3 Both Mebco and Refco were buyers and sellers of various
currencies. 29 4 In essence, the disputed fund (U.S. dollars) had been wire transferred
into the Account on the afternoon of April 28th, the day after Mebco was placed
into liquidation, Koreag appointed, and before Refco had notice of the Swiss
proceedings. 295 Mebco was then expected to transfer to Refco bank accounts
abroad foreign currencies of the same amount.29 Also, without notice of the
liquidation proceedings, Refco transferred foreign currencies to Mebco's European
accounts for which Mebco was to transfer dollars of an equal amount to the
Account. 297 "The net result of these aborted currency exchanges is that Refco
transferred approximately $6.9 million into the Account, and approximately $4.1
million worth of foreign currency to overseas Mebco accounts, for which Mebco
failed to make reciprocating transfers [the "Disputed Funds"]. 298 Upon learning of
the liquidation proceedings, Refco obtained an ex parte attachment of the Account
and moved for confirmation of the attachment. 29 9 Koreag then intervened, seeking
comity to the Swiss proceedings and the dismissal of the attachment
proceedings.3°0 The district judge suggested that a section 304 petition was the
better way to proceed, which Koreag promptly filed.30 i In its petition, it sought an
injunction against further efforts by Refco to reach the Account and an order to
turn the Account over to Koreag for administration in Switzerland. 30 2 The
bankruptcy court granted Koreag summary judgment and the district court
affirmed.30 3 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded.3 °"
On appeal, Refco argued that the Disputed Funds were not property of the
foreign estate, and that even if they were, the lower courts had improperly applied
the section 304(c) factors.
305
Section 304(b)(2) authorizes the bankruptcy court in an ancillary proceeding
to "order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property,
to such foreign representative. 30 6 The court resolved this question principally on
the ground that Collier's on Bankruptcy clearly read the statute to provide that
"[flor purposes of section 304, the estate of a foreign debtor is defined by the law
of the jurisdiction in which the foreign proceeding is pending, with other
292. Id.
293. Id. at 344-45.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 345.
296. Id. at 344-45.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 345.




303. Id at 346-47 (2d Cir. 1992).
304. Id. at 347.
305. Id.
306. II U.S.C. § 304(b)(2) (2000)(emphasis added).
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applicable law serving to define the estate s interest in particular property."30 7 The
court found this analogically supported by reference to domestic cases where the
actual interest of the debtor is defined by state law, even though section 541(a)
takes a broad approach to property of the estate30 8 Thus, the court determined that
a prerequisite to turnover under section 304(b)(2) is a determination by the U.S.
bankruptcy court that the property sought to be turned over is property of the
foreign debtor.3 9
Should Swiss or New York law apply9 The court noted that there was some
dispute in the cases as to what choice of law rules should apply-federal common
law or state law. 3i' Finding both applied an interest analysis, there was no need to
resolve the issue.31 1 Applying interest analysis, the court found that both New York
and Switzerland were interested in the dispute.3i 2 Refco was located in New York,
Refco performed in New York, the disputed funds were in New York, 3,3 and "New
York as a world financial center has a special concern with transactions such as
occurred here. ' 4 While Switzerland was interested in the administration of
Mebco's estate, its interest did not especially implicate the property issue at
stake.3 '5 Thus, New York law was to be applied in determining the competing
claims to the Disputed Funds.3i6
Refco asserted two claims: one for a constructive trust over the Disputed
Funds, and the other for the right to reclaim by a seller under former Uniform
Commercial Code (herein "UCC") section 2 -2 0 7 (2 ).37 The court found that a
plausible case for constructive trust had been made under New York law and
remanded with the "practical burden" on Koreag to show why a constructive trust
should not be imposed.3 18 Turning to the reclamation issue, the court rejected
Koreag's claim that Refco had to comply with Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)
because an ancillary proceeding under section 304 was not a full bankruptcy,
section 546 authorized the trustee or debtor-m-possession to proceed, and the
foreign representative was neither. 3'9 However, the court concluded the UCC did
not prevent the foreign currencies transfer from being property of Mebco's estate
and were therefore subject to turnover under section 304(b)(2).320 The court
307. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 348 (quoting 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 304.01, at 304-3 (15th Ed.
1992)(emphasis added).
308. Id. at 348-49.




313. Actually, this is unclear. The Disputed Funds included by definition of the court both the
dollars Refco transferred into the Account and the foreign currencies transferred into foreign bank
accounts of Mebco.




318. Id. at 352-55.
319. Id. at 356.
320. Id. at 356-57.
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concluded:
If Refco prevails on the constructive trust issue upon remand, none of the
Disputed Funds will be subject to turnover. If Koreag prevails on that issue, only
the portion of the Disputed Funds involved in the [foreign currencies transfer] will
be subject to turnover. Under any view of the relative weight to be accorded the
pertinent § 304(c) factors, turnover would be a permissible exercise of discretion
as to those funds.
32 1
In my judgment, Koreag is a good example of conflicts analysis in an international
insolvency case. I cannot be as complimentary to the next decision, at least as to its
analysis.
The Tenth Circuit recently decided In re Grandote Country Club Company,
Ltd.322 Like so many international insolvencies, the facts are relatively complex. A
golf course located in Colorado was originally owned by a U.S. group known as
"Grandote Colorado, who failed to pay certain Colorado taxes in 1990. 323 A
member of the group sold the property to a person who then sold it subject to tax
liens to Grandote Country Club, Ltd. ("Grandote Japan"-the debtor in Japanese
bankruptcy proceedings) in February 1993.324 In May 1994, Grandote Japan
conveyed the property back to Grandote Colorado (the "Japan to Colorado
transfer").325 Another party purchased tax certificates, who then conveyed them to
still another, who then brought a successful forcible entry and detainer action
against the property 326 Grandote Japan declared bankruptcy in July 1994 and its
trustee filed a section 304 ancillary petition and received recognition sufficient to
bring the instant action, contending that the Japan to Colorado transfer was
avoidable under Japanese law and seeking to avoid the Tax Deeds under
Colorado's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.327 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 28
The Tenth Circuit, in a confusing opinion on this issue, perhaps reached a
correct result, by discussing section 304(c), and noting the goal of providing relief
in an ancillary proceeding is to "assure an economical and expeditious
administration. 329 It then turned to "two competing values prnciples of
comity, which favor application of Japanese law, [and] the interests of the locality
where the property is located, which favor application of United States/Colorado
law. ' 330 The court noted that the bankruptcy court in the section 304 proceeding
had found Japanese bankruptcy law consistent with the prnciple features of U.S.
321. Id. at 358-59.
322. In re Grandote Country Club Co., 252 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2001).
323. Id. at H 48.
324. Id.




329. Id. at I150.
330. Id.
VOL. 32:2
CHOICE OF LAW IN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
law.33' Citing Koreag, but hardly following it, the court drew on its statement that
"local law [should] determine whether the debtor has a valid ownership interest in
that property when the issue is properly posed by an adverse claimant. 332 It cites
Koreag, and Colorado law, for the proposition that the law of the state with the
greatest interest should be applied.333 It then concludes that "Colorado has the
greatest interest" because of the property's location, the tax proceedings, and the
execution of most of the documents.334 Nowhere does the court consider, or even
mention, the Japanese interest in recovering the debtor's property for the benefit of
creditors. It may be that seriously considering the Japanese interest would leave the
decision with Colorado law. But, it is not possible to determine which state has the
greatest interest without looking at the interests of both states and the competing
policies. Moreover, while it mentions it does not consider the federal policy
seeking to further the "economical and expeditious administration" of the debtor's
estate.335 The court, unlike the Second Circuit in Koreag, simply fails to engage the
applicable law. It then concludes that the tax deeds were not avoidable under the
Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
336
Another interesting decision is Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd
v. Simon.337 This majority opinion in Simon is arguably a little confused, but it
reaches the right result and is not actually a choice of law case. The debtor Simon
was a Hong Kong resident and businessman when he personally guaranteed a
corporation's large debt, for which, he was the major shareholder.338 The debt was
guaranteed to the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. ("HKSB") and was
part of a Hong Kong transaction.339 Hong Kong law was the law chosen in the
guarantee. 340 Greatly in debt, Simon moved to the United States and eventually
filed for personal chapter 7 341 The HKSB guarantee was listed in the schedules,
but HKSB did not file a proof of claim on that claim, but on a different one.342
HKSB is an international bank incorporated m Hong Kong, with offices in New
York and California.343 The bankruptcy court granted Simon a discharge and
issued an injunction in accord with the discharge injunction of Bankruptcy Code
section 524(a)(2). 34 4 Two weeks later, HKSB filed a complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment, that the discharge injunction did not reach its efforts to
pursue Simon personally abroad on his guarantee, or to claim against non-estate
331. Id.
332. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 349 (as quoted in Grandote Country Club, 252 F.3d at 115 1).
333. Grandote Country Club, 252 F.3d at 1 151.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1150-51.
336. Id. at 1151-52.
337. In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998).
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property abroad on the guarantee.345 The bankruptcy court held against HKSB, and
was affirmed by the district court.
346
The court had some difficulty in the first part of the opinion, to which there
was a dissent by Judge Hall. 347 The court first determined whether Congress had
acted clearly to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality 348 In an
extended discussion, it concluded that via section 541 (a) Congress had in fact
intended to assert the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction in rem over the property of
the debtor wherever it is located.349 The case law relied on is largely domestic, and
not international.3 5 °
Judge Hall reasoned that section 541(a)'s generality did not in fact reach
everywhere, and that the Supreme Court had adopted rules of construction to avoid
possible clashes with international law 3i More importantly, that was not the issue
in Simon. The court did not need to reach property in Hong Kong. It needed to bind
HKSB which had offices in California, had filed a proof of claim with the
bankruptcy court and over whom the bankruptcy court had personal jurisdiction.352
That is clearly enough to bind HKSB to the injunction. The majority finally turned
to this issue and concluded similarly 313 Before finishing, however, it considered
international comity 354
The discussion on comity is quite good, even though this case is not a case of
choice of law American law in final form and without appeal had enjoined
HKSB 5 The issue was whether this injunction, with extraterritorial effects,
violated the international comity between courts.356 This case was not an attempt to
enjoin a foreign court. Here the court cited, but did not discuss, the Restatement of
Foreign Relations section 403(l), 3 57 and instead followed Maxwell for the
proposition that this case did not deal with the question of deference to a foreign
proceeding, but was rather a case where the United States was unquestionably the
situs of a plenary bankruptcy proceeding, to which Hong Kong might need to
defer.5 The court stated:
The Bankruptcy Code does not codify either of the theories proffered by the
parties [territoriality or universalism]. Rather, the Code provides for a flexible
approach to international insolvencies dependent upon the circumstances of the
particular case. If any philosophy can be attributed to the structure of the Code it
345. Id.
346. Id. at 994-95.
347. Id. at 999.
348. Id. at 996
349. Id.
350. See id.
351. Id. at 999-1000.
352. Id. at 994.
353. Id. at 999.
354. Id. at 997-99.
355. Id. at 999.
356. Id. at 998.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 998-99.
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is that of deference to the country where the pnmary insolvency proceeding is
located, including the United States if the plenary proceeding is located here.
3V
While this quote can be presented as the question of what law to apply to the
question of discharge, U.S. law or foreign law (unlikely where the debtor is an
individual domiciled in the U.S.), it is better seen as a reflection of the fact that the
bankruptcy discharge actually operates as an injunction against a broad range of
enforcement activities.360 Thus, the discharge issue is predominantly one of
personal jurisdiction. The harder question in Simon would have been the
application of the discharge injunction to a non-resident of the United States, who
had no property in the United States, and who did not file a proof of claim. In such
a case, personal jurisdiction would be dubious and, in any event, extraterritorial
enforceability is practically impossible.
In the next case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not address
the choice of law issue and seemingly took a step back toward the territoriality
view of section 304 by emphasizing one of the subsections over the others, rather
than balancing the factors.36i The court also implicitly assumes, which may be
correct in context, that forum law will govern many of the legal issues.
362
In The Bank of New York v. Treco,363 the court faced a typically complex case
of an insolvent Bahamian bank.364 The bank, Mendien International Bank Limited
("MIBL"), controlled a number of banks primarily located in Africa.365 It had a
relationship with the Bank of New York and JCPL Leasing Corp, a subsidiary of
The Bank of New York Company, Inc. and affiliates ("BNY").36 MIBL pledged
its accounts with BNY in the June 1993 MIBL Pledge Agreement. 367 Later, MIBL
arranged an overdraft relation with BNY in the ultimate amount of $15.15
million. 368 This overdraft account was secured by funds deposited with BNY by a
MIBL subsidiary, Mendien BIAO Bank Tanzania ("Mendien Tanzania"), and
pursuant to an agreement (the "Meridien Tanzania Agreement"). 369 When MIBL
defaulted on the overdraft obligation, BNY liquidated the Mendien Tanzania
pledged account.370 This liquidation occurred in March 19 9 5 .37
1
In April 1995, the Central Bank of Tanzania appointed a manager to operate
Meridien Tanzania, who challenged the Meridien Tanzania Agreement and
demanded the return of the $15.15 million.372 On April 25, 1995, MIBL was placed
359. Id. at 998.
360. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000).
361. See Inre Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 148.






370. Id. at 152.
371. Id. at 151-52.
372. Id.
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into involuntary liquidation in the Bahamas and Liquidators were appointed.373 In
June 1995, BNY filed an action in the Southern District of New York against
MIBL, Mendien Tanzania, and several other subsidiaries (the "District Court
Action"). 374 This action sought a declaratory judgment that BNY had the right to
retain the Meridien Tanzania liquidated account, or in the alternative, an order
allowing BNY to essentially setoff the $600,000 remaining in MIBL's BNY
accounts.375
In September 1995, the Bahamian Liquidators filed an ancillary proceeding
under section 304, seeking a stay of all actions against MIBL and the turnover of
all of MIBL's U.S. assets.376 The Bankruptcy Court issued a preliminary injunction
in March 1996, and the District Court action proceeded against the remaining
defendants.377 That action was settled, BNY agreed to pay $4 million to Meridien
Tanzania's assignee, and BNY was assigned all Mendien Tanzania's rights of
subrogation against the MIBL accounts.378
In the meantime, the Liquidators' right to the turnover of the $600,000,
BNY's claims against the $600,000 for its payment of the $4 million to Mendien
Tanzania's assignee, and BNY's subrogation rights acquired from Meridien
Tanzania, came to a head in the Liquidators' motion for partial summary
judgment.379 The bankruptcy court granted the Liquidators' motion on January 22,
1999 380 On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the district court on September
10, 1999 381
The Courts' decisions were reversed by the Second Circuit.382 Both Bahamian
and U.S. law recognized the status of a secured creditor.383 Under Bahamian law,
however, numerous administrative claims have priority over the claims of secured
creditors.384 On the facts of the case, the supremacy of administrative claims over
secured creditors was problematic for BNY Here, the Liquidators had recovered
approximately $10 million and incurred administrative expenses of almost $8
million, leaving $1 75 million in the estate. 385 The administrative claims were
routinely paid without notice to creditors.38 6 Thus, there was a substantial
likelihood that BNY would recover only a small portion of its $600,000 secured
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 152.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 152-53.
379. Id. at 153.
380. Id., see also In re Treco, 229 B.R. 280 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y 1999) (Judge Gamty) (the
bankruptcy court's opinion covers many issues not decided on appeal and is worthy of careful study).
381. In re Treco, 239 B.R. 36 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
382. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Treco, 239 B.R. 36 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
383. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 152-53.
384. Id. at 155
385. Id. at 159.
386. Id.
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claim, if ultimately recognized as secured, in the Bahamian proceeding.38 7
The court recognized that section 304 "was a step toward the universality
approach.38 8 It described the approach as "a primary insolvency proceeding
instituted in the debtor's domiciliary country, [with] ancillary courts in other
jurisdictions [deferring] to the foreign proceeding and in effect [collaborating]
to facilitate the centralized liquidation of the debtor s estate according to the rules
of the debtor s home country. 3 8 9 But, the court also stated that "[s]ection 304 does
not implement pure universality 090 Rather, the court notes, the statute endorses
the five factors of analysis in section 304(c) noted above.39'
In dealing with the structure of section 304(c), the court noted that while
"comity is the ultimate consideration in determining whether to provide relief,"
that "comity does not automatically override the other specified factors. 392
Thus, section 304(c) "calls for a case-specific exercise of discretion in light of all
of the circumstances. '393 Unfortunately, this statement inherently means that no
precedent provides clear guidance for the future, unless the facts are very similar.
This statement also means that settlement, or the avoidance of litigation, is not
aided by reasonably clear case law For the Second Circuit, the structure of section
304(c) requires a court to "determine whether comity should be extended-to the
foreign proceeding in light of the other factors. '394 This quote of course adds
nothing to the language of the statute.
The court thus rejected the Liquidators' argument that the case called for a
straightforward comity analysis (whatever that would be!). In doing so, the court
in my mind amazingly said:
[wie think the proper question to ask is whether § 304(c)(4) [whether the foreign
distribution priority is 'substantially in accordance with the order' prescribed by
U.S. law], along with the other factors, requires the court to deny turnover in the
circumstances of this particular case, despite its goal of assunng an
economical and expeditious administration of foreign estates.'
39 5
This statement seems hard to square with the basic structure and language of
section 304(c). It seems to interpret this subsection to say that the goal in providing
relief, or turnover, of the economical and expeditious administration of the estate,
is limited by the five factors. Indeed, the case as a whole, with its fact specific
analysis, seems to raise the order of distribution in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to
the status of a trump in ancillary cases.
The Court concedes that "the first three factors present no bar to affording
387. Id. at 159.
388. Id. at 154.
389. Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
390. Id. at 154.
391. Id. at 154-55, 158-60.
392. Id. at 156.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 157.
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comity to the proceedings in the Bahamas. 396 Again, notice the use of the factors,
not as a basis of analysis for the exercise of the discretion for which comity calls,
but as limits on the deference adopted as the general rule in international
insolvency cases. Thus, the Court, like the lower courts, was quite satisfied with
the procedures, non-discrimination, and prevention of preferences available in the
Bahamas. 97 While conceding that the priority rules need not be identical in both
countries in order for deference to attach, that is nevertheless the sole basis here for
refusing to defer. The court noted the high risk that the administrative costs would
eat up the estate and leave nothing for even a secured creditor.
398
The court assumed BNY's claims were secured for purposes of the section
304 analysis. 399 It now noted that that decision had not been made below and that
the case needed to be remanded for that determination. 4°° It also noted that because
a right to a setoff resulted in a secured claim under U.S. bankruptcy law,4°' the
lower court would also have to determine that issue apparently under U.S. law.40 2
Since the Bankruptcy Code does not create any setoff rights, 0 3 but only recognizes
those that exist under other law,4° the court should have left open the question of
whose law determined the right of any setoff. Moreover, it is not obvious that if a
setoff right exists, its status as secured must be determined by U.S. law. After all,
the status of a claim under the Bankruptcy Code is for the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code, and not necessarily for the purposes of the economical and
expeditious administration of a foreign estate in an ancillary proceeding.40 5 The
court simply used section 304 as the exclusive statement of all factors to be
considered in ancillary cases. 406 That was not the approach in Maxwell,40 7 but then
Maxwell was a plenary chapter 11, and not an ancillary proceeding governed by
section 304.408
396. Id. at 158.
397. Id. at 158-61.
398. One reading of § 304(c)(4)'s reference to the order of distribution is that the class order must
be substantially the same not that an individual creditor would receive the same or substantially similar
distribution. Courts have not focused on this distinction but it seems necessarily implied. Otherwise, §
304(c)(4) collapses all foreign insolvency cases to cases where U.S. courts would defer only when the
foreign distribution to the U.S. creditor is both procedurally fair by U.S. standards, i.e. like U.S.
standards, and that creditor would receive substantially the same distribution. This is not much of a step
towards universality or comity.
399. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 161.
400. Id.
401. II U.S.C. §506(a) (2000).
402. See In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 161.
403. See I I U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
404. Id. at §553.
405. Cf. id. § 304(c).
406. In re Treco, 240 F.3d at 153-61.
407. In re Maxwell Communications Corp., 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).
408. Id.
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V CHOICE OF LAW OR JURISDICTION SELECTION PRINCIPLES?
The Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency was adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") on May 30,
1997 409 The Model Act has been the basis of the proposed Title 15 of the United
States Code in various bankruptcy bills. 410 It basically calls for greater cooperation
in cross-border insolvencies, strengthens the express tools of the U.S. bankruptcy
courts, and adopts a number of procedures to make the process more predictable.4 '
It has little to do with choice of law issues. In this sense, I am critical, but not
surprised. Conflicts scholars for some time have noted the paucity of legislation for
domestic conflict of laws cases with little success.412 Statutory choice of law rules
are rare in the United States,4 13 although they are becoming more frequent and
more coherent in Europe.414 As the global economy grows and becomes ever more
constant in the lives of many businesses and their attorneys, the problems bnefly
mentioned in this article will become more regular, and the courts will be forced to
seek more coherent and predictable rules. The construction of these rules will
require the efforts of many.
Some versions of Universality call for the selection of a single forum for
insolvency proceedings. Implicitly and explicitly, the law would be that of the
forum, but this rule does not necessarily follow Applying a single state's law in a
conflicts setting would make matters somewhat less complex; however, it would
also merely force parties to do battle over the forum selection process. With so
much Territorialism in the world, this solution would not solve much. The
traditional conflicts of laws approach divides the work of issues into jurisdiction,
effect of foreign judgments, and choice of laws. 1 5 In the insolvency setting, I
believe that this scheme is in use, but only in the background because it is not
clearly acknowledged. An insolvency proceeding conceptually has four aspects:
(1) collection of the estate; (2) determination of claims against the estate; (3) some
system of priority of distribution of the limited assets; and (4) procedures for
handling these matters. The procedures have traditionally been those of the
forum.41 6 It would seem that there should be a single scheme for the distribution of
the limited assets of an insolvent estate hence, the strength of the universalist
appeal. The nature of the estate's interests in property, and the legitimacy and
409. See 36 Int'l Law Materials 1386 (1997) (for text of Model Act).
410. See 36 int'l Law Materials 1386 (1997); Current version is Title VIII, H.R. 975, 108"h Cong.
(2003).
41 i. 36 Int'l Law Materials 1386 (1997).
412. Roger C. Cramton, David P Currie, Herman Hill Kay, and Larry Kramer, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, 90 (5t' Ed. 1993) and Robert A. Leflar, 44 Tenn. L. Rev. 951, 951 (1977).
413. Cf. Revised U.C.C. § 9-301(2) adopting the location of colliteral for the perfection, effects of
perfection, and priorities for certain transactions.
414. Reiman, supra note 27 1.
415. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS p. XI-XXVII.
416. Id. at§ 122.
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value of creditor claims seem to be matters on which substantive law varies
throughout the world and, hence, calls for a choice of law analysis. As noted
above, the basic choice of law guidelines for (1) and (2) exist in state and federal
law Items (3) and (4) are at least somewhat covered by section 304.417
In this article I have tried to show that federal choice of law principles have
had limited impact in cross-border insolvency cases. Too many courts have
become embroiled in trying to work out the factorial elements of Bankruptcy Code
§ 304(c) in order to determine whether to grant the relief allowed in ancillary cases
by § 304(b), and the insoluble question whether § 304(c)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (6)
are independent of or examples of (5)(comity). In doing so the principle goal of
"an economical and expeditious administration of such estate" in § 304(c) is
diminished. As statutory law, of course, § 304 prevails where it is intended to do
so. But it is too much to assume from the text that § 304 is intended to be
complete and to exclude choice of law principles whose function is to decide what
law determines what issues.
In conclusion, I only can hope that focusing on the absence of and utility of
choice of law principles will inform future judicial and academic consideration of
cross-border issues.
417 I1 U.S.C. § 304(b)(3) (2000).
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